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Abstract 
The United States Senate is one of the major legislating forces in the United States and 
can make policy impacts that can have significant impacts for the entire nation . The two major 
political parties in the U.S . have significant influence on the members of this body , yet they are 
elected to represent each of the different states. Previous research has shown that states and 
districts can vary significantly in their political leanings and preferences , even from the party that 
is considered the majority in that area. The purpose of this study is to investigate several forces 
that may influence members' of the U.S. Senate voting patterns - specifically how frequently 
they vote with their party. The main variables in question are the individual state ideology and 
the state ideological heterogeneity , or how diverse the ideological viewpoints are of those in each 
state. Other factors used in this analysis are the ideology and ideological heterogeneity of each of 
the major political parties in the state, the previous election margins of victory for incumbent 
Senators , and leadership positions of the Senators . Over the course of this research, it was found 
that there are major differences between the two parties in how they respond to each of these 
variables . Republicans were more responsive to increases in homogeneity among their 
constituents . Democrats didn't seem to respond at all. Both parties did vote more frequently with 
their parties as they became ideologically extreme. Overall , this study has important implications 
for how individuals are represented by their elected officials, how changing political 
demographics may affect representation , and it gives greater insight into how U.S. Senators 
choose to balance competing interests. 
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The 2010 Alaskan Senate Election was certainly momentous , to say nothing of its 
historical implications. Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski, had been appointed to be 
Senator by her father in 2002 , and won reelection in 2004. But during the Tea Party 
upheaval of the Republican Party in 2010, Murkowski was defeated in her primary 
election to Joe Miller , who was backed by the current Governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin . 
She was one of several incumbent Senators to lose their primary to Tea Party candidates . 
However , for Murkowski the fight did not end there . She decided to run as a write-in, 
independent candidate, and barnstormed the state, giving bracelets out to constituents so 
they could remember how to spell her name. While Alaskan politics are unique , the 
results were meteoric. Murkowski cjefeated Miller , the Republican nominee who was 
expected to win, as well as the Democratic nominee Scott McAdams. She was the first 
individual to win a Senate seat by write-in in 50 years , and the first-ever incumbent 
Senator to win their seat back by write-in election . While elections like this are very rare , 
there are important features of this election that made the circumstances and outcome 
possible ; examining some of them will help current Senatorial elections and voting 
patterns become more understandable and hopefully provide insight into this elected 
body. 
First of all, it should be noted that the political climate was right for incumbents to 
lose reelection in primary elections , particularly incumbents who were considered 
"moderates." But Alaska itself has some unique features that made such a dramatic 
election possible. Some of these features have to do with the homogeneity of the ideology 
of the citizens of the state , or the diversity of political views among the constituencies 
being represented, as well as the extremity of those views . In Alaska , the Republican 
Party is slightly more extreme than the average Republican Party in each state , and is one 
of the most heterogeneous . Murkowski , a political moderate , facing reelection in a party 
that is diverse , but slightly more extreme than most Republican parties, and riding the 
national Tea Party wave put her in a very vulnerable position. The fact that the popular 
sitting governor Sarah Palin , a Tea Party Darling and dynastic figure in Alaskan politics , 
backed Joe Miller only added to Murkowski's woes. Miller narrowly defeated 
Murkowski , with 51 % of the vote. Following this close primary election, Senator 
Murkowski made the decision to run as an independent write-in candidate in the general 
election. Alaska is a moderate state that leans conservative and typically votes 
Republican in major elections . However, when you look at the ideological heterogeneity 
of the viewpoints in Alaska as a whole, they actually tend to be one of the most 
politically diverse states in the nation . This is not a political climate that is very 
welcoming to partisan extremists - the likes of Joe Miller - in a general election , because 
on average the public does not reach consensus very frequently, and there is obviously a 
strong coalition of dissen ting voices from the opposing party. This unique electoral 
environment, combined with name recognition, and major election spending helped 
propel Murkowski to victory in the general election in 2010. 
While there are many reasons that this remarkable election occurred , and this 
story may appear anecdotal , electoral attitudes of the voting population are significant, 
and likely played a major role in this election . Those we elect to public office are often 
strongly motivated by reelection, and uµderstanding how the public perceives them may 
influence how they choose to represent the public. Representation is a major topic of 
study by political scientists, and by understanding how constituency ideology and 
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diversity influences that, we can gain greater insight into how our elected officials are 
influenced by those factors. 
The United States has several representative bodies , one of which is the Senate. 
The U.S. Senate is a unique governing institution for several reasons, including the 
independence of the members due to their longer terms , and the influence given to each 
of them by Senate rules , among other things. However , the members are still charged 
with representing constituents in their states , and most belong to political parties based on 
their ideological views and policy goals . The states they represent are themsel ves very 
unique , and the constituents ' views vary greatly state to state , even if party affiliation is 
the same, and there is significant ideological variation within the state (Levendusky and 
Pope 2010). Not only must legislators gain an understanding of their constituents ' 
political preferences, but also legislators face other pressures , the most commanding 
coming from their political party. Parties are nearly essential for election to major 
political office , and play major administrative roles in the Senate. Senators rely on the 
party for resources required for election , and the party needs the Senators to help them 
make their desired policies law. 
We have already seen that elected officials can face difficult demands from their 
constituents that they are charged with representing . They also must balance demands 
from the political party that often provides basic support , and many have an unclear idea 
of what it means to be a representative In this study, I will work to unravel how elected 
officials make decisions in their roles by studying how ideological heterogeneity in states 
influences party loyalty in the United States Senate. To begin , I will examine literature 
regarding representation , ideological heterogeneity , and party loyalty in Congress. 
Starting in the 1960' s with Miller and Stokes , political scientists have been 
working to study how constituent preferences influence Congressional voting patterns . In 
a refinement of their work, Robert Erikson found that constituent preferences played an 
even larger role than previously predicted in influencing their representatives . He also 
sought to clarify whether or not a representative is more likely than the loser in an 
election to vote with the electorate because they are selected from within the electorate. 
The alternati ve is that they were selected because their views are more congruent with the 
constituency 's, and thus they were selected , notwithstanding their previous voting block. 
Erikson reached the conclusion that while elected officials can be more effective 
representatives because they are selected from the constituency , the constituency will 
often exert more control over the representative by their electoral behavior , and by 
selecting officials that represent their preferences . (Erikson 1978) 
Building on this theory , Joshua Clinton sought to understand partisan differences 
in how elected officials - specifically House Members - represent their constituents . He 
also looked at different sub-constituencies that could be represented , which he identified 
as same-party constituents or nonsame-party constituents. Overall , the different sub-
constituencies are not represented differently in a meaningful way . But when you look at 
how each party responds to sub-constituencies , there are important differences. The 
Republicans, who were the majority party for the Congress that was studied , were more 
responsive to same-party constituencies , while Democrats were more responsive to 
nonsame-party constituencies . Because this was not over an extended period of time, it is 
difficult to say whether these differences were because of party or majority status, but 
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they do provide significant insight into sub-constituencies , and how these groups may 
influence voting patterns for those selected to represent certain areas. (Clinton 2006) 
One of the most widely acknowledged theories ofrepresentation is the median 
voter theorem (Downs 1957). This theory predicts that legislators will vote according to 
the preferences of the ideological median among voters in their district , in order to 
maximize the number of constituents they are appealing to, and increase their electoral 
success. This is because the median voter's preferences are closer to all other voters ' 
preferences than any other single voter. There are variations on this theory , such as the 
idea that legislators represent the median voter in their constituency , but not necessarily 
among their entire district (Levitt 1996). This i:rieans that among the voters who elected 
them, the median voter is represented. There are also some theories that directly 
contradict the median voter theory, like the one proposed by Bafumi and Herron, called 
Leapfrog Representation . This is defined as the trend of "when a congressional legislator 
is replaced by a new member of the opposite party , one relative extremist is replaced by 
an opposing extremist." This theory holds that the median voter is altogether skipped 
over each time a new representative is elected , and is minimally represented . At the same 
time, extreme views are over represented , creating backlash from the opposing party , 
which causes an electoral swing to the other extreme. (Bafumi and Herron 2010) 
On an even more fundamental level, there is a theoretical basis suggesting that 
individuals interpret their role of representative differently. Some legislators act as 
delegates, directly representing the will of the people. Some choose to act as a trustee , 
acting in what they believe to be the best interest of those they represent. Finally , there is 
a cohort called politicos who fluctuate between the aforementioned styles of 
representation . (Gross 1978) The style an individual takes to represent their constituency 
is a key factor in understanding how the public is represented at large. 
There are practical challenges to representation as well. Published in American 
Economic Review , Steven Levitt attempts to break down what factors influence how a 
Senator votes. He argues that personal ideology is one of the most important 
considerations a Senator makes when deciding how to cast a vote. He also makes the 
point that support constituency plays a more important role than the median voter. One 
final important result he highlights is that legislators become more sensitive to voter 
preference as elections draw closer. (Levitt 1996) While this study uses a more economic 
approach, and several of the points he makes are contested, it highlights the fact that 
representation is not a simple task, and is variable across time and between legislators. 
Levitt also highlights the importance of a voting constituency in representation , and how 
partisans , or partisan-leaners may play an important role in influencing legislators. 
The major issue that representatives and voters face when making public policy 
decisions in a representative government is communication (Gastil and Black 2007). 
Legislators must be able to effectively communicate their views and the policy decisions 
they make to voters in order to campaign effectively . It is also imperative that they 
understand their voters ' preferences in order to legislate accordingly. Voters hold their 
legislators accountable for their voting behavior (Grynaviski 2010). When a 
representative is seeking reelection, they must be able to show their constituents that they 
are effectively representing them '. whether that is by voting according to the constituents' 
preferences as a delegate , or by successfully communicating that they are voting in the 
best interest of the constituents as a trustee. However , a major inhibitor to understanding 
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voter preferences is diversity among the constituency. 
Diversity can be demographic or ideological , and Bishin et al. found that both 
types of diversity influence the ability ofrepresentatives to understand voter preferences . 
While all senatorial candidates show some responsiveness to voter preferences , Bishin 
found that it is much more common among individuals in states with demographic and 
ideological homogeneity. In fact, they found that, "Citizens in homogenous states seem to 
obtain the same representational benefits as do those living in House Districts designed to 
maximize descriptive representation of a particular racial or ethnic minority group ." 
(Bishin, Dow and Adams 2006) These results are noteworthy. It is extremely significant 
that some states naturally have the same level of ideological homogeneity such that they 
are being represented at the same level as a House district that is meant to maximize 
representation. Similar results were found in other studies , although for most studies , the 
main variable studied is ideological heterogeneity. In a study done by Gerber and Lewis, 
it was found that in ideological heterogeneous district s, representatives are less 
constrained by the median voter , and vote more frequently with their party (Gerber and 
Lewis 2004) . In another study regarding ideological heterogeneity , Harden and Carsey 
argue that in heterogeneous states , Senators attempt to balance constituent and party 
pressures (Harden and Carsey 2012). This differs from most of the other literature 
because they argue that in heterogeneous states , diversity is a balancing mechanism, 
rather than a weakening influence on constituent representation . They , too, found that the 
median voter has little impact on Senators from heterogeneous states, while party 
influences exert a much stronger role. 
My study will look at responses to ideology through the lens of party loyalty. The 
American two party system is very unique , and has critical electoral and legislative 
impacts. In 2010 , Jamie Carson , along with several others , published an article studying 
how party unity voting affected electoral outcomes for incumbent Congressmen. Using 
both experimental data , and data from the House of Representatives , they found that 
voters punish Congressmen in general elections for being too partisan , by voting for them 
less frequently . However , Congressmen are not punished for being too ideologically 
extreme . (Carson , et al. 2010) This suggests the American public is unsupportive of overt 
partisanship . However, in response to this article , Nicholas Pyeatt did a study on how 
partisanship influences primary election results for incumbent Congressmen and found 
that more partisan members of Congress were less likely to face a primary challenger , 
and more likely to receive a higher percentage of the vote share . He also found that more 
ideologically extreme members of Congress were more likely to have a primary 
challenger. Primary voters , who are typically more politically active, but a smaller 
portion of the population , seem to reward partisan behavior. (Pyeatt 2015) The results of 
these studies have remarkable implications for Congressmen. They must walk a fine line 
of partisanship , and know their constituency well enough to know how to balance their 
partisanship. In some states, the primary elections are far more competitive than the 
general election , and in others the general election is the more competitive election 
(Turner 1953). It is also noteworthy that partisanship has increased in recent history . 
This could be related to an increase in primary elections rather than convention 
nominations , or it could be a result of other historical trends and electoral outcomes in 
modern history . 
Partisanship and party loyalty are not static variables that are only influenced by 
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electoral odds for each Congressman . At a macro-level , party realignment between the 
1950s through the 1980s had a significant impact on party loyalty in Congress, as the 
parties became more ideologically similar through a process of sorting , and thus 
Congressmen voted with their party more frequently (Brewer and Stonecash 2009) . On a 
more micro-level , Volden and Bergman found that party cohesion is strongly influenced 
by majority or minority status, the cohesion of the other party , and shifts in the median in 
the Senate , and varies each Congress. (Volden and Bergman 2006) Indeed, other studies 
as well have found that party unity voting on an individual level is very strategic. Both 
moderates and extremists at various times will use disloyalty to gamer support from their 
constituencies (Slapin and Kirkland 2014) , but ideological extremists are more likely to 
vote with their party when party leaders are seeking votes (Minozzi and Volden 2013). 
Although party members can be cohesive while representing the states in 
Congress, a defining feature of American government is federalism, allowing for fifty 
unique States . This, in tum , creates unique differences at a state level between the major 
political parties. These differences can stem from policies of the state, such as campaign 
finance laws or voter registration laws. State culture can also play a major role in creating 
differences between the same parties in different states . One more important factor is how 
the party itself is organized and run in each state . Each state party makes decisions about 
organizational structure, electoral strategies , and nominating mechanisms, such as 
caucuses , closed primaries , or open primary elections. These factors that influence the 
state party, and the state party itself likely have an impact on party ideological 
heterogeneity in each state. (Gray and Hanson 2004) 
Hypotheses and Methods 
While there are several studies on ideological heterogeneity , few focus on the 
effects that has on party loyalty among legislators , although party loyalty and polarization 
are increasingly relevant topics . I will study how state ideological heterogeneity 
influences Senators' party unity voting . The main topic of study will most likely result in 
one of two outcomes. First we could observe that Senators from states that are more 
ideologically heterogeneous will vote more frequently with their party , while Senators 
from states that are ideologically homogenous will have lower party unity scores. This 
reflects the theory that in homogenous states, legislators are better able to receive cues 
from voters on their preferences and it is simpler to maximize benefits , while in 
heterogeneous states , legislators have a more difficult time deciphering voter preferences , 
and thus take cues or give in to pressure from their respective parties , because they 
cannot maximize benefits to their constituency. Though the aforementioned hypothesis is 
commonly accepted , the reasonable alternative is that Senators from more homogenous 
states will vote more frequently with their party because , except in rare cases , states have 
partisan preferences. Thus, a homogenous population would belong to the same party and 
Senators would choose to represent that party . In this case, Senators from heterogeneous 
states may have lower party unity scores because they are making a conscious effort to 
represent a more ideologically diverse population . I will make these observations about 
the differences in party unity voting as influenced by state ideological heterogeneity in 
the context of comparing results from Senators belonging to the Democratic and 
Republican parties. I will also examine how state party ideology and ideological 
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heterogeneity influences party unity. The hypothesis in these cases would be similar . It 
may be that Senators from homogeneous state parties will vote less frequently with the 
party in the Senate because they can take cues from their unique party in their state. It 
could also be the case that Senators from states with homogenous state parties have 
higher party unity scores because their state party has clear preferences that are likely in 
line with the national party sentiment. Both outcomes seem equally possible because the 
research on this specific topic is so sparse . 
State ideology and ideological heterogeneity are the independent variables in this 
study, and are central to understanding the ideological attitudes in each state. In this field 
of study, these variables have been measured in a variety of ways . Presidential vote 
percent by state has been used as a measure, but this is a fairly unspecific measure and 
may measure state partisanship and mood more so than ideology (Carson, et al. 2010). 
Another measure has been policy mood polling, but polling and sampling varies state to 
state , making it a poor measure when using it as a comparison between states (Harden 
and Carsey 2012). Ross, Cann, and Burt established the method I used in this study, and 
similar methods have been used in other studies. This method uses data from the 
nationally distributed The Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). The 
ideology data comes from aggregating data from the CCES in the years 2009, 2010 , 
2011 , 2012 , and 2014. The questions used covered a range of issues including abortion , 
taxes, the War in Afghanistan , and other major issues in current politics. Individual 
ideology scores were calculated, and after those calculations, both the average ideology 
for the self-identified Republicans and Democrats were calculated and the average 
ideology for the entire state . These are the state ideology scores , and represent general 
political leanings of the state. The scores range from about -1 to 1, with negative numbers 
being liberal , and positive numbers being conservative. The standard deviations for these 
groups and sub-groups were also calculated, as a measure of dispersion is extremely 
important for this study- this is the ideological heterogeneity variable. For example, two 
states could both be considered moderate on average , but one of those states could be 
homogenously moderate , while another state could be could be heterogeneously 
moderate , meaning that there is a wide dispersion of ideologies in the state. Individuals 
were considered Republicans if on the survey they reported being a "Strong Republican," 
"Weak Republican," or "Leaning Republican." They were classified as a Democrat if 
they reported being a "Strong Democrat ," "Weak Democrat," or "Leaning Democrat." 
The dependent variable for this study is party unity scores of individual Senators. 
Annually , Congressional Quarterly publishes party unity scores for each individual 
Senator. These scores are the percentage of times a member voted in agreement with their 
party. They are based on votes cast, and so not voting does not influence a member's 
party unity score . I used data from the years 2007-2016 . While there has been some 
criticism of party unity as an effective measure of partisanship , overall it has been used 
by many scholars to measure party loyalty without maj or issue (Krehbiel 2000). Part of 
its strength comes from the fact that voting is the primary data source from each Senator , 
and it is a relatively unambiguous source when interpreting for meaning, because it is a 
strong indicator of each Senator's preference. It can reflect a Senator's willingness and 
electoral freedom to buck their party , or a strong commitment to a certain party's values 
and goals. 
To test the hypothesis, I ran multivariate regression models on the data , for 
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Republican and Democratic Senators . I ran different models by party because of the 
nature of the ideological heterogeneity data , and to make comparisons between 
Republicans and Democrats . In order to gain the most accurate representation possible, I 
used a number of control variables in my analysis . I will briefly explain each of those 
variables and their importance . Later , I will also discuss the partisan results in the context 
of these variables. 
Incumbent Senators ' State Party Ideology : This variable is the state party 
ideology for senators of the same party. For example , in my regression model for 
Democratic Senators , this is the Ideology score of those considered Democrats in each of 
their states . This prevents a bias due to party strength in the data , and also allows for 
analysis of how state party ideology influences party loyalty in the Senate . 
Incumbent Senators' State Party Ideological Heterogeneity : This variable is very 
similar to the previous variable, except rather than being an average ideology score, it is 
the standard deviation, or a measure of variance. This signifies the level of differences 
within the party , and how diverse the party is. It gives an idea of how ideological 
heterogeneity within a party may influence party unity voting. 
Party Leadership : This variable is used as an indicator for whether or not each 
Senator belongs to the Party's leadership . I have defined being in a leadership position as 
being a Majority/Minority Leader, Whip , Caucus Leader , Conference Chair, or 
Conference Secretary. Previous research by Harden and Carsey has shown that being in a 
party leadership position results in a higher likelihood to vote with the party , and thus 
making it an important control variable when measuring party unity (Harden and Carsey 
2012). 
Primary Election Margin of Victory : This variable is a numerical value 
representing the difference between the winning candidate's and the next closest 
candidate's vote percentage for Senators in the primary election previous to each year the 
data is gathered for. As was previously mentioned , partisan voting behavior is rewarded 
in primary elections , and it may be possible that Senators who faced close primary 
elections will display more partisan behavior following the election (Pyeatt 2015) . 
General Election Margin of Victory: Similar to the preceding variable , this is a 
number that is the difference between the winning candidate's and the next highest vote 
getter ' s percentage , from the election prior to the year of the data being collected. 
Research shows that legislators who vote more frequently with their party often receive a 
smaller vote share than those who vote less frequently with their party (Carson , et al. 
2010). It may be the case that Senators who have small reelection margins will vote less 
frequently with their party in order to prevent punishment at the polls by voters . 
Primary Election Margin of Victory Squared: This variable is the squared value 
of the winning candidate's primary vote percentage . This is particularly important 
because some of those who advanced in the primaries actually lost on the first ballot, so 
this ensures all numbers are positive. It also highlights the effect by creating larger 
values . 
General Election Margin of Victory Squar ed: This represents the squared value 
for the margin of victory in the general election for the winning candidates . Although 
there were no negative results for the general election , this is again an important variable 
because it displays a much clearer view of the results because they are exponentially 
larger. 
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Variable 
Results 
The results of this study differed significantly between the two major political 
parties , and have major implications for this field of study. In this section , I will discuss 
how Democrats ' and Republicans' party unity was affected by their state ideology and 
ideological heterogeneity , and the noteworthy role other variables may have played in 
party unity for these groups. 
a e : ummarv aa T bl 1 S D t 
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Deviation 
Party Unity Scores 90.86 10.29 38 100 
State Ideology Scores 0.06 0.22 -0.45 0.44 
State Ideological Heterogeneity Scores 1.28 0.05 1.21 1.46 
State Democratic Party Ideology Scores -0.91 0.18 -1.27 -0.47 
State Democratic Party Ideological 0.94 0.04 .0.86 1.04 
Heterogeneity Scores 
State Republican Party Ideology Scores 1.10 0.11 0.82 1.26 
Republican Party State Ideological State 0.87 0.03 0.81 0.94 
Heterogeneity Scores 
Primary Election Margin of Victory 70.21 33.25 -10.47 100 
General Election Margin of Victory 23.21 17.82 0.01 100 
I will begin my analysis by looking at the results for the Democratic Senators. 
During the time period that I studied, Democrats were a Senate majority for eight of the 
ten years. When looking at the state ideology measure , which measures the liberalness or 
conservativeness of the state's population , there appears to be a negative correlation, with 
the correlation coefficient being -16.96. This means that when a state's ideology score 
drops by one point, thus the average ideology is leaning strongly liberal , a Senator ' s party 
unity score will increase by about 17 points. However , here it is important to note the 
summary data on Table 1. One standard deviation for state ideology is only about 0.22 , so 
the typical changes in party unity scores for most of these Senators is less than 4 points. 
That being said, this variable does reach a level of statistical significance at the 95% 
confidence interval. As a state becomes more ideologically liberal, Democratic Senators 
from that state will vote with their state more , while Democratic Senators from more 
ideologically moderate, or in rare cases conservative , states will vote less frequently with 
their party. 
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Table 2: Democratic Senators' Results 
Regression Table for Democratic Senators 
Variable Coefficient Standard t-value P>t 
Error 
State Ideology* -16.96 3.68 -4.61 0.000 
State Ideological Heterogeneity 7.35 10.70 0.69 0.492 
Democratic Party State Ideology -0.77 5.51 -0.14 0.888· 
Democratic Party State Ideological State -18.50 9.46 -1.96 0.051 
Heterogeneity 
Leadership 1.77 1.16 1.52 0.128 
Primary Election Margin of Victory -0.27 0.05 -0.57 0.571 
General Election Margin of Victory 0.10 0.08 1.28 0.201 
Primary Margin of Victory Squared 0.0002 0.0004 0.58 0.561 
General Election Margin of Victory -0.0015 0.0014 -1.06 0.289 
Squared 
Constant 99.41 10.19 9.75 0.000 
*Denotes Variables that reach a level of statistical significance at P>0 .05 or greater . 
Democrats showed a slight positive relationship between party unity voting and 
state ideological heterogeneity, but this did not reach a level of statistical significance. 
This has some important implications, not the least of which is that while Democrats are 
highly attentive to the overall ideological position of their state population , they do not 
appear to be affected by the level of diversity within the state. This could lead to a 
Senator from a state where the general population is moderately liberal voting in the 
exact same way as a Senator from a state that is moderately liberal because there are 
some very liberal individuals and some moderate or conservative individuals. 
There was also only a very slight effect of the Democratic Party Ideology on party 
unity voting for Democratic Senators , and it did not reach a level of statistical 
significance. These findings imply that Democratic Senators place more value on the 
ideological views of the state population as a whole, rather than just those who identify 
with their party . Another valuable finding is that Democratic Party Ideological 
Heterogeneity has a negative relationship with party unity scores. As each state's 
Democratic Party becomes more homogeneous (their scores decrease) party unity voting 
will increase . A one-point decrease in heterogeneity is associated with about an 18-point 
increase in party unity voting. Again , it is important to look at the standard deviation for 
this independent variable on Table 1, which is about 0.044. One standard deviation 
change results in a less than one point change in party unity scores, because the variation 
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in Democratic Party Ideological Heterogeneity is so small. The level of significance for 
this variable is also important to note. The relationship is significant at a 94.9% 
confidence level. This does not reach the typical standard of significance in the field of 
political science. Yet to deny that there is any effect when the level of significance is so 
close to the threshold of 95% confidence would be unwise. So while this variable does 
not in fact, meet the normal standard of confidence, it does appear to have some effect on 
party unity voting and further research should be done to examine this relationship. 
Senators with leadership roles may have been more likely to vote with their party 
than those who were not in leadership positions in the Senate, but the effect is slight, and 
does not reach a level of statistical significance. This may suggest that Senators feel most 
of their obligation to their state, and that being in a position of power does little to shift 
their priorities. However, these findings conflict with previous research and more study is 
necessary to reach a conclusion. 
The variables Primary Election Margin of Victory and General Election Margin 
of Victory have some interesting implications, and will be discussed in direct comparison 
to the Republican results, where they can be presented with more clarity, following the 
overall discussion of the Republican Senators' results. 
The results for the Republican Senators differed significantly from the Democrats. 
As Republican Senator's states became more ideologically conservative, the Senator's 
are more likely to vote more frequently with their party. This is a positive correlation, 
because as a state becomes more conservative their ideology score becomes a higher, 
positive score. The coefficient is 41.56 for Republican Senators, meaning, as a state 
becomes one point more ideologically conservative, party unity scores will increase by 
more than 41 points. Because the standard deviation for state ideology is only about .22, 
the typical change in party unity scores is about 9 points for Republicans. This effect does 
reach a level of statistical significance at a 95% confidence level, and the effect is about 
twice as large for Republicans as it is for Democrats. These results indicate that 
Republicans may be more responsive to changes in ideology among their constituents 
than their Democratic counterparts . A change in ideology would only need to be half as 
significant for a Republican Senator to adjust their party unity voting compared to a 
Democrat. 
State ideological heterogeneity also had a statistically significant impact on party 
unity voting for Senators. These two variables had a negative relationship, such that as a 
state became more ideologically diverse, party unity voting decreased among Republican 
senators. The correlation coefficient is -58.38, for every one point increase in state 
ideological heterogeneity. But again, it is important to look at the standard deviation of 
these variables to determine the real effect that we are seeing. The standard deviation for 
state ideological heterogeneity is 0.055, so when most of the Republican Senators' states 
become more ideologically diverse, their party unity scores change only about 3 points. 
While this seems like a much smaller impact, it is still important to note that it did reach a 
confidence level above 95%. Republicans appear to be aware of the ideological diversity 
in their states, and voting patterns differ accordingly. 
Republican Senators had a very small positive response to changes in the ideology 
of the state Republican Parties. The effect was minor and was not statistically significant. 
Similarly, Republican Senators had a slight positive response to changes in ideological 
heterogeneity within their party, but this too did not reach a level of 95% confidence. 
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Regression Table for Republican Senators 
Variable Coefficient Standard t-value P>t 
Error 
State Ideology* 41.56 6.04 6.88 0.000 
State Ideological Heterogeneity* -58.38 15.29 -3.82 0.000 
State Republican Party Ideology 7.69 12.77 0.60 0.547 
State Republican Party Ideological 25.35 21.94 1.16 0.249 
Heterogeneity 
Leadership 2.45 1.63 1.50 0.134 
Primary Election Margin of Victory 0.11 0.06 1.96 0.051 
General Election Margin of Victory* -0.20 0.08 2.61 0.009 
Primary Margin of Victory Squared -0.0009 0.0005 -1.72 0.086 
General Election Margin of Victory 0.0013 0.0008 1.58 0.115 
Squared 
Constant 125.64 20.52 6.12 0.000 
* Denotes Variables that reach a level of statistical significance at P>0.05 or greater. 
It seems , at least from 2007-2016 , that while Republicans seem more attuned to the 
policy mood and ideological diversity of the state as a whole , they are either unaware of, 
or apathetic to changes in their state parties' ideological position . Contrastingly , 
Democrats are more aware of diversity among their party members , but may not be as 
aware of the state as a whole . 
Senate Republicans also had a very slight increase in party unity voting when they 
were in a leadership position, but this change did not reach a level of statistical 
significance. As was the case for the Democratic Senators, leadership seemed to play a 
minor role in party unity voting in this study, especially when controlling for state 
ideology . This could be because ultimately Senators feel more obligations to their state 
than party, or because party leaders may be selected from states with strong ideological 
preferences and homogeneity , so party unity voting is unaffected. 
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Primary and General Election Variable Results 
As was previously mentioned , the results regarding party unity voting among 
Senators and the two election variables are particularly interesting because of the 
especially important nature of these variables . While the main purpose of this study is not 
to examine how election outcomes influence party unity voting in the U .S. Senate , to 
simply ignore the results that became available would be a waste of valuable information 
about election impacts on legislating , and differences between our two major parties. 
Elections are a huge part of American politics and culture , and examining election 
outcomes and the relationship between major political institutions can provide greater 
insight into each of these parts of American government. 
Primary elections are much more party-centered , and the results seem to vary a 
great deal more, with some people losing the primary election , yet still receiving their 
party's nomination or winning the general election. This resulted in negative margins of 
victory for some individuals , which made the analysis slightly more difficult. This was 
one reason for creating a Primary Margin of Victory Squared variable - to nullify the 
negative results . 
For Democratic Senators, as their primary margin of victory increases , their party 
unity scores decrease . Yet this effect is minute , and does not reach a level of statistical 
significance. For Republican Senators , there is a positive relationship between primary 
election margin of victory and party unity score , meaning as the margin of victory 
increases , so will party unity score. The coefficient for this variable is 0.1146 , but to put 
it into context , the average standard deviation for primary election margin of victory is 
about 33 points , so most Senators ' party unity scores will be influenced by about 3 
points . This reached a level of significance at the 94.9 % confidence interval , so while it 
was not statistically significant at the accepted level for the field , to discount a 
relationship between party unity scores and primary election victory margins for 
Republicans would be discarding what could be a valuable relationship . Neither party had 
statistically significant results for the Primary Margin of Victory Squared variable . 
Graphs 1 and 2 give a clearer display of the actual effect we are seeing because of 
this variable. Holding all the other variables constant , pred icted party unity scores are 
calculated for each member based on their margin of victory in their primary election. 
For members of the Democratic Party , party unity scores are highest when the margin of 
victory is low, and as margin of victory increases party unity scores decrease . After 
reaching a low point at about 60 points, party unity scores begin to ascend again as the 
victory margin increases . It is very important to reiterate that this effect did not reach a 
level of statistical significance, and that the effect is very minor. While there is a visible 
trend on the graph , the changes are so small that they would be almost indiscernible in 
comparison to real party unity scores . However , this is an important unit for comparison 
between parties , and it provides valuable insight into the quadratic relationship that we 
would otherwise be unable to see. Before discussing any implications these results may 
have , I will also discuss the general election results to give a clear picture of what is 
taking place . 
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Graph 1 
Democratic Party Unity Scores and Primary Election Results 
-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Primary Margin of Victory' 
For Republican Senators , the graph of their predicted party unity scores and 
primary margin of victories are near opposite results as the Democrats. Party unity began 
low with those whose margins of victories were very low. It then increased as the victory 
margins increased , peaking between a 60 and 70 point win . However , those who truly 
swept the competition , or were uncontested, showed lower levels of party unity voting 
than some of their counterparts. These results are statistically significant. 
General elections have significantly more part icipation , as well as a much more 
diverse set of individuals participating in them . Generally , the results were less dispersed 
than they were for primary elections . For Democrats , the General Election Margin of 
Victory variable had a slightly positive relationship, but was not statistically significant. 
The General Election Margin of Victory Squared variable had a very small negative 
relationship, but was also not statistically significant. This suggests that there is likely no 
relationship between a Democratic Senator's party unity score and the margin of victory 
by which they won their election . On the other hand , Republicans had a negative 
relationship between party unity and general election margin of victory. This means that 
these Senators were less unified with their party when they won their general election by 
a larger percent of the vote . The opposite is also true. This did reach a level of statistical 
significance at the 95% confidence level. The coefficient was -0.1975, and the standard 
deviation for general election margin of victories was 17.8 points , so most Senator's 
scores would only fall about 3 points as their election margin increased. The General 
Election Margin of Victory squared variable did not reach statistical significance for 
Republican Senators. 
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Graph 2 
Republican Party Unity Scores and Primary Election Results 
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Graphs 3 and 4 again provide more insight into the trends we see for the 
Democratic and Republican Senators in regards to their party unity scores and their 
general election margin of victory. Graph 3 shows the predicted party unity scores for 
Democrats based on their general election results. Keeping in mind that these results are 
not statistically significant, we can see that as the margin of victory for Democratic 
Senators increases, they are more likely to vote with their party, with a peak just above a 
victory margin of 30 points. After reaching that point, party unity scores tend to decrease 
as the victory margin increases. The difference in party unity scores is almost 
indiscernible for Democratic Senators, and none in this group won by more than 60 
points, so this trend line gives a bit more detail into what we may see, but can't be used 
for any definitive statements or predictions . 
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Democratic Party Unity Scores and General Election Results 
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Republicans had an opposite response as Democrats to the results of their general 
election margins of victory . Graph 4 displays the anticipated party unity score based on 
the general election margin of victory for the Republican Senators. Those competing in 
the closest elections seemed to have the highest party unity scores , beginning at about 85 
points . Then as elections become less competitive, Republicans display less party unity, 
with those who had a victory margin of about 73 points having a party unity score of less 
than 78 points. There is a slight uptick for those with extremely high margins of victory 
who are Republicans. These results were statistically significant , and the range of scores 
is much greater for Republicans than it was for the Democrats . 
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Graph 4 
Republicans' Party Unity Score and General Election Results 
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Interpreting the Differences 
As we have seen, Senators from each of the major political parties in the United 
States responded in very diverse ways to the variables that were observed in this study. 
This section will not seek to understand why the parties reacted this way, but rather what 
the differences were, and what the implications of these differences and all the results are 
for the study of the U.S. Senate . 
State ideology is a key part of federalism and research in this field, and Senators 
seemed to react differently to changes in this variable depending on their partisanship . As 
was discussed in detail earlier , Democrats and Republicans both seemed to vote more 
frequently with their party when their states became more ideologically extreme , 
although it was not statistically significant for the Democratic Senators. So while the 
relationship is inconclusive for the Democrats, it was evident that Republicans were 
strongly influenced by the ideological viewpoints of their constituents. This variable 
actually had the largest impact on their party unity scores . Based on these results , state 
ideology is the largest factor in determining how a Republican Senator will vote, and 
suggests that many representatives choose to work as a delegate , representing the will of 
their constituents . 
Ideological heterogeneity also suggests that Republicans are very sensitive to their 
constituents ' views , and changes in them, while no conclusions can be drawn for the 
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Democratic Senators . Republicans ' party unity scores would decrease as state ideological 
heterogeneity increased . This is the second most important factor in predicting 
Republicans' party unity scores. Why Republicans are more responsive to their entire 
state's ideology is unclear , but for both of the state ideological variables , the Republicans 
are significantly more likely to respond to constituent ideology , and make a direct effort 
to represent the views of the citizens of their state . If this topic is explored further , we 
may gain some valuable insights into the differences between parties. 
Neither Democrats nor Republicans had statistically significant results when 
regressing party ideology on party unity scores , and Democrats were just bordering 
statistical significance for party ideological heterogeneity , while Republicans did not 
show any strong effect. It is important that Democrats are responsive to diversity and 
ideological shifts within their base , but it appears that neither party has strong reactions to 
the ideology their party. This may suggest that because they have foundational support 
they are less concerned with policy mood among their party loyalists , and are catering to 
independent and swing voters . This would probably be in an effort to maximize votes , 
because strong partisans will likely support the party ' s nominee no matter what , but 
independent voters and weak partisans may be more vulnerable . However , it is important 
to be aware of changes in the party ' s ideological mood because it may have stronger 
influences on primary elections that are becoming increasingly more competitive (Turner 
1953). 
Holding a leadership position in the Senate also had no significant impact on 
party unity voting for members of either party. This conflicts with other research done on 
this topic that states Congressional leadership votes with their party more frequently than 
non-leadership members . More research is necessary to evaluate the true effect of holding 
a leadership position on party unity voting for Senators. But the results from this study 
could indicate that members from both parties feel greater obligations to their states than 
their parties , even when in high-pressure roles where they are the party leaders . 
Reelection is a high priority for Senators , and this could suggest that even party leaders 
feel that reelection prospects are more important than party loyalty. The interpretation of 
these results could also be much simpler. Party leaders may just be picked from 
ideologically homogeneous states where the party is strongly represented , to ensure they 
have high reelection chances and represent the party ideologically. 
The margin of victory for primary elections did not appear to have a significant 
effect on the party unity scores for Democrats , and while it didn 't meet the 95% 
confidence interval threshold for Republicans , it reached a 94.9%, which is sizable 
enough that it should not be dismissed. Republicans were more likely to vote with their 
party when they had a greater margin of victory in their primary. We cannot infer 
causality from this relationship, but there are a couple of things that could be taking 
place. First , these results could imply that Republicans who are more partisan in their 
voting patterns receive a greater share of the vote in their primary elections. Primary 
elections are more partisan in nature , and as was noted , partisan behavior is rewarded in 
primary elections (Pyeatt 2015) . Another related implication we can take from these 
results is that those who receive a greater portion of the primary vote may choose to vote 
more frequently with the party to reflect their voter ' s preferences , while those who have a 
very small margin of victory may not feel as strong of a connection to their party and 
may vote more with the diverse preferences in their states. These outcomes are not 
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mutually exclusive and could be working together to make an impact on how Republican 
Senators choose to vote . There may be a slight trend in the opposite direction for 
Democrats, but because the effect is so small and not statistically significant , no 
conclusions can be drawn . There is no clear inclination for how Democrats respond to 
varying margins of victory in their primary elections . More research on this topic is 
necessary to draw any definitive inferences about these results. 
The general election margin of victory was also not statistically significant for 
Democrats, but it was for members of the Republican Party. However, Republicans 
reacted in the complete opposite way when it came to this variable . As the margin of 
victory increased, party unity voting decreased for these Senators. However , these results 
are consistent with the literature as well. Senators who vote more frequently with their 
party could be punished in general elections for their partisan behavior by the more 
diverse and independent voting population . Alternatively , Senators who are receiving a 
greater portion of the vote share could feel less obligated to their party , or more obligated 
to a heterogeneous _voting block who elected them, and could choose to vote less 
frequently with the party because of these results . Again, it is not that these options are 
one or the other - these factors could be working together to create the effect we observe. 
But further research into the subject is necessary to gain proper insight into the subject. 
Interestingly , Democrats again seem to react in the opposite manner , but there is only a 
very slight effect that is not significant, so to make any conclusions would be 
presumptuous. 
Addressing the Hypothesis 
In regards to the hypotheses , and possible outcomes , it seems that at least for 
Republican Senators , the second hypothesis is true. As states became more ideologically 
extreme, and homogenous party unity voting actually increased among this group. This is 
contrary to the research that suggests that it is heterogeneity that actually increases party 
unity scores, as Senators will take more cues from their party and feel less restrained by 
their diverse constituency . On the other hand, Democrats did vote more frequently with 
their party as their constituency became more extreme , but constituent homogeneity had 
little impact on their voting patterns at all. This suggests that this group is attuned to 
overall policy mood, but pays little heed to diversity of viewpoint within their state. Both 
of these findings conflict with much of the current literature regarding the ideological 
heterogeneity and party unity voting, and pro:vide avenues for future research that may 
provide more insight into why there are such major differences between the parties. 
Conclusion 
Discerning patterns in voting is a key part of studying our law making institutions 
here in the United States. Because parties play such a substantial role in American 
politics, viewing voting patterns through the lens of party unity can give insight into the 
influence each party has on its members. This is especially true as we investigate the 
varying ideological viewpoints in each state. The U.S. federal system allows for states 
with significant ideological differences and variance to elect their leaders which , I 
hypothesized, would impact their voting patterns . For Republican Senators there was an 
influence on party unity voting based on ideological extremity and heterogeneity . These 
results have critical implications for this field of study. The Republicans responsiveness -
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and Democrats apparent non-responsiveness for most of the observed variables - to their 
constituents and the diversity within their state could have strong influences on their 
election outcomes . This may have been one of the major factors that made a difference 
for Senator Murkowski as she ran - and won - her write-in campaign in a general 
election . This could be the case for senators that because they are receptive in their voting 
patterns , it is likely that they are also receptive in their campaigning . This could draw a 
larger number of voters to them than would otherwise be anticipated. Currently more 
people identify as Democrats than Republicans , yet Republicans have control of 
Congress, the majority of gubernatorial positions , control of most state legislatures, and 
the presidency (Jones 2017) . There are many factors that will influence this but the fact 
that Republicans in the U.S. Senate are more influenced by state ideology may be one of 
them. They are responding more frequently to voter preferences , and may be rewarded 
electorally for that response. 
Another implication of this research deals with the representation of individuals . 
Individuals living in states represented by Republicans are more likely to have their 
preferences catered to if the state is diverse . However , the voting margins in these 
preferences is so small that the Senator will still most likely be voting with their party a 
majority of the time. However , Democratic Senators show no reaction to changes in 
ideology or diversity within each state. This is concerning for those being represented 
because it suggests their voices may not be heard by their elected official. Even within 
parties these results have interesting implications for voters. Active partisans often make 
up a base of the voters who vote in primaries, donate to campaigns , and volunteer for 
campaigns (Saunders and Abramowitz 2004) . Yet neither Democrats nor Republicans 
had strong responses to the ideology of their state party , and Democrats may have had a 
slightly significant response to ideological heterogeneity within their party but 
Republicans did not. The voters who are exceptionally active in supporting their party , 
especially early on in the election cycle, may not be receiving many benefits because of 
the apparent indifference of Senators to the ideology of their state political parties. Most 
elections have much more predicable outcomes than the 2010 election in Alaska , but that 
doesn't mean that electoral outcomes, or subsequent voting patterns based on the 
population of the state are straightforward. Elected officials have many demands upon 
them, including several groups they are called upon to represent. This deeper insight into 
how electoral factors, as well as factors related to state ideology, ideological 
heterogeneity, and sub-constituency ideology can, however , aid scientists, strategists , and 
the voting public in understanding the legislative decision making process of their 
Senators . 
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Reflective Writing 
A capstone is a finishing stone added to a wan or arch in order to complete it. 
Completing my honors capstone has been one of the most challenging yet rewarding 
experiences of my undergraduate career. As I began working on it more than a year ago, I 
had the challenge to decide how tackle this opportunity, and if it was something I would 
consider worth it. Looking back, I can easily say that is was , for innumerable reasons. I'll 
go into detail about just a few to explain how I have grown through this process , and how 
I really view it as a "capstone" to my education. 
First of an , completing this thesis reany anowed me tie together my education in a 
way that I think few things could . As a dual major in Political Science and Economics, 
which are housed in different colleges, there is little overlap in material that I am 
learning , although the concepts are inseparable . Writing a thesis allowed me to apply 
economic concepts , models, and statistical practices to my passion for studying 
legislative politics. It also allowed me to practice the statistical skills I had learned in both 
disciplines , as well as the analytical skills I have worked on through my undergraduate 
career. Writing a thesis was one of the closest things I got to real world experience in the 
field of policy analysis. This has been wonderful as I prepare for more education and to 
eventually enter the workforce. 
Another significant benefit to writing my honors thesis was the relationship I 
developed with my mentor , Dr. Damon Cann. I have worked with him for three years, but 
as I began to work more independently on this project, I began to learn even more from 
him. Not only did he consistently teach me about how to run statistical models , how to 
write for a research audience, and how to present findings in a way that are 
understandable, but he taught me important lessons about character and teaching itself 
He pushed me to be more than I thought I could, because he saw potential in me that I 
could not see. This meant stepping back even when I thought I was drowning in the work. 
Dr. Cann taught me that being on someone's side means helping them to achieve all their 
goals, even when it is hard. He also taught me that being a good mentor, and professor, 
includes patience, kindness, and ways of boosting confidence . I think learning to be a 
good person is just as useful in higher education as the academic skills you learn. What 
good are academics if you won't use them to help? Dr. Cann taught me more than anyone 
I know at Utah State both in academic knowledge and in positive character . This 
mentorship has been key to my education here at Utah State. 
Another benefit that I had not anticipated from this project was how it taught me 
about research within my field, and research in general. As an undergraduate researcher , I 
felt that I had a good understanding of research - this is something that I have grown up 
with and been working through for the past eight years ofmy life. Yet , completing a 
project of this magnitude so independently taught me a great deal. I learned what a 
process it can be. I changed my ideas multiple times as I researched, looked for data, and 
did more background research. I then wrote and rewrote and rewrote again , trying to find 
the best words to say what the numbers were actually saying. The process was so much 
longer and more strenuous than I had imagined. I also learned how much research there is 
in political science and in economics, and how interrelated they are. My subject was 
highly specific, yet I still found related studies, and there were so many other specific 
studies that I needed to understand to form my hypotheses . It was fascinating . Perhaps 
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one of the most fun parts of this project was the discovery of information and 
relationships I wasn't even looking for. The beauty ofresearch is that we often find 
something valuable, even if it wasn't what we thought. I remember when that really 
started to click, it was thrilling. 
A project on state ideological heterogeneity and party unity voting in the United 
States Senate doesn't seem very connected to the community or world around me. It is a 
niche subject, and the Senate is one of the most elite governing bodies in the world. This 
simply doesn't seem like it applies. But discovering how it did, and how it could be 
important to people around me was enlightening . It was difficult at times - it takes mental 
stretching . But when I realized that behind the numbers, behind the state heterogeneity 
scores, and ideological units, and margins of victory , were real voters who cared about 
issues, then it became much more real. I realized that although it seems obscure, there are 
people who want to be represented, and it is important we know if and how that is being 
done. That is the first step to making sure they are being represented in the best way 
possible , and once we have this knowledge, we can connect people to their legislators, 
and hold them accountable . They can decide, but they have to know first, and what I did 
was start to help us know what is happening . I love being able to use my passion for 
research to help people work effectively in their political system. 
Overall , writing a capstone was difficult and there were times I didn't think it was 
possible. I didn't think I could do it. But having done it, I can now say that it completed 
my education in a unique way. I developed strong relationships, connected my varying 
interests, gained a much deeper education on research, and found ways to help my 
community. These are just some of the benefits . I learned that I can do hard things, and 
that the results are so gratifying. 
Final Word Count on Body of Thesis: 8,643 
Final Word Count on Reflective Writing: 1,008 
Total Word Count of Thesis: 10,573 
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